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Abstract
Many factors contribute to weak economic growth in Appalachia, but little research has examined the role of banking heterogeneity and efficiency across states. This paper documents
how West Virginia (WV) banks’ financial behavior differs from other U.S. banks and shows
these differences cannot be explained fully by the composition of banks in the state. Despite
experiencing faster banking consolidation, West Virginia still has more and smaller banks that
are less efficient and profitable. WV banks’ customers and managers heavily favor liabilities
(time deposits) and assets (real estate loans) with longer maturity and lower risk and returns.
Although shares of time deposits and real estate loans are positively correlated across states in
part due to lower interest risk, other factors are needed to fully explain banks’ financial behavior across states and the connections to the real economy. Heterogeneity in the risk aversion of
banks’ customers and managers is one possible explanation.
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Introduction
“The economic development of West Virginia required sound banking establishments and availability of adequate capital, neither of which existed in the antebellum era. A general shortage of money...further impeded economic advancement.”
(Rice and Brown, 1993)
Could sub-par banking services still be impeding economic development in 21st -century

West Virginia — or Alabama (Barth et al., 2016) and similar states? Certainly economic development differs widely across states. Long before the 2016 presidential election, challenges
facing Appalachia and West Virginia—the only state entirely in the region— were widely
documented in the media (for example, see McCarthy, 2014; Badger, 2021, gives a more
recent assessment). Scholarly research also showed that many diverse factors contribute to
weak growth such as: low rates of labor force participation (Stephens and Deskins, 2018) and
entrepreneurship (Stephens et al., 2013); declines in coal mining and manufacturing (Herath
et al., 2013); poor education (Minuci et al., 2019); drug addiction; and lack of transportation
access and internet accessibility (Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness and West
Virginia University, 2015).
Table 1 illustrates some of the well-known challenges by comparing economic statistics
for West Virginia (WV) and the United States (US) in 2017, a representative year in the
latter part of the expansion.1 West Virginia’s population was small (less than 1 percent),
shrinking (about 1/2 percent per year), and relatively old. WV income and housing wealth
were far below average (14 and 42 percent, respectively). And the WV labor market was
weak with high unemployment (1 percentage point higher) and extremely sub-par labor force
participation (10 percentage points lower). Yet despite this economic malaise, somehow WV
boasted markedly higher home ownership of 75.1 percent (11 percentage points higher).
Much less is known, however, about the connections between West Virginia’s financial
market conditions and its real growth despite advances in research on differences in real
1

In 2017, the U.S. economy was expanding broadly and steadily. The comparison is qualitatively and
quantitatively similar for several years before and after 2017 and thus not influenced by the business cycle.
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economic growth across states. Summarizing the recent literature, Berger et al. (2020) conclude, “[t]he evidence strongly suggests positive effects of banking on the real economy.”2
One reason is that banks are unique from other firms, even non-bank financial firms, due to
the monetary nature of their liabilities and role in credit supply (Guttentag and Lindsay,
1968; Wood, 1970; Egan et al., 2021). More recently, the literature documents how banks
can be unique from each other for reasons such as their mix of services (Liu et al., 2020)
or their portfolio allocation of assets (James, 1987; DeYoung et al., 2015). Banks are heterogeneous in their charter, size, age, market structure, customer base, income-generation
strategy, and regional economic conditions; Jamilov (2021) documents bank heterogeneity
in the macroeconomy. However, uniqueness of individual banks does not necessarily mean
that diffusion of branches through interstate banking would result in uniqueness of the composition of banks in each state. In fact, a natural null hypothesis might be that diffusion of
interstate banking would lead to homogeneous compositions of banks across states. Thus,
a key question is whether the nature and quality of banking services varies across states. If
so, does that cross-section variation correlate with states’ real growth?
As a first step toward answering that question, this paper describes the nature and
performance of state-level banking—the most basic element of financial services—starting
with West Virginia. The focus here is on cross-sectional heterogeneity in 2017, but results are
robust in surrounding years. Time-series variation also may be interesting and important
but is more complex and left for subsequent research. Using standard FDIC bank-level
data, the paper shows how the composition and behavior of WV banks is unique from other
U.S. banks and how banks in other states—some economically similar to West Virginia and
others not—are unique as well. Banking conditions may not explain all, or even most, of
the economic growth in a state or region. But differences between WV banks and those in
states with stronger economic growth may reveal clues about: 1) opportunities for reforms
and innovations that could improve banking services in a state or region; and 2) possibly the
2

See also Danisewicz et al. (2018), Zingales (2015), Berger and Black (2019), Berger et al. (2019), Brown
et al. (2019), Khan and Ozel (2016), Nguyen (2019), and Berger and Sedunov (2017) for other examples.
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role of banking in the regional real economy.
The paper makes three main contributions. First, it documents key empirical differences
between banks headquartered in WV and those headquartered in all other U.S. states (denoted US*). Although WV banks have been consolidating faster than US* banks, West
Virginia still has more banks and branches per capita that are less efficient and profitable.
Aggregate financial statements show numerous significant quantitative differences in the financial conditions of WV banks. Two key results are that WV banks held: 1) twice as high
a share of real estate loans (56 versus 27 percent); and 2) twice as high a share of time deposits (21 versus 10 percent) and a one-third lower share of MMDAs (21 versus 31 percent).
Classifying banks by the number of states in which they operate makes the uniqueness of
WV banks clearer. Banks headquartered in US* but operating in WV have low shares of
real estate loans (23 percent) and time deposits (2 percent), so operating in West Virginia
does not explain the uniqueness. Likewise, US* banks operating in a single state also have
lower shares of real estate loans (31 percent) and time deposits (12 percent), so single-market
banking also does not explain the uniqueness.
A second contribution is using bank-level regression analyses to test whether heterogeneity in the observable characteristics of banks and state economic conditions can explain
differences in banks’ financial behavior across states. The composition of banks is heterogeneous across all states, not just West Virginia. Banks’ observable characteristics and states’
economic conditions are significant explanatory variables for banks’ financial behavior. However, neither standard fixed-effects models with bank characteristics nor mixed-effects models
that add state-level economic variables can fully explain cross-state heterogeneity in assets
(loans) or liabilities (deposits). Some of the unexplained financial behavior may stem from
unobserved heterogeneity among banks’ customers, who choose different deposit products,
and/or banks’ managers, who make different loan (investment) decisions.
Finally, the paper’s third contribution is an introductory, non-structural analysis of the
joint relationship between sources of funds (time deposits) and uses of funds (real estate
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loans) across states. There is a strong positive correlation across states between banks’
shares of time deposits and real estate loans. This correlation is likely explained in part
by the inherent effects on interest rate risk through qualitative asset transformation (QAT).
Time deposits have longer fixed maturities and lower rates than MMDAs or other demand
deposits, so banks may have an incentive to invest more in assets with longer fixed maturities,
such as real estate loans. However, the linkage between maturity transformation and interest
rate risk cannot explain all the cross-section heterogeneity in banks’ financial conditions.
Taken together, the results suggest two important directions for future research to better
explain cross-state heterogeneity in banking. One is modeling the dynamic regional diffusion
of banks across states after interstate banking regulations were relaxed. Understanding why
and how each particular bank optimally expanded over time to the specific state(s) in which
it now operates is central to this effort. A second task is modeling the joint optimization
problems of a bank’s customers and managers to discover more fully why the mixes of
liabilities and assets are correlated. This effort likely requires a general equilibrium model
with bank customers’ utility and (non-financial) profit maximization problems, including
demand for deposits and loans, plus bank managers’ usual profit maximization problem
for financial intermediation, including joint supply of deposits and investment of assets.
This complex framework further requires disaggregation by geographic region and perhaps
dynamics as well. Once the optimality conditions of this modeling framework are understood,
it should be more feasible to discover the exact linkages between regional banking and the
real economy. Until then, policy prescriptions would be premature.

2

Literature Review

This section briefly surveys the literature examining the nature and implications of bank
heterogeneity across geographic regions. The goal is to describe research that can motivate
how the composition of banks in one state (geographic region) might differ from that in
other states. Previous research examined heterogeneity of banks within states. Barth et al.
4

(2016) provides an empirical analysis of bank business models in Alabama, another state with
weak banking performance, below-average economic growth, and a lower standard of living.
Tokle and Tokle (2000) and Hannan (1979) focus on pricing competition among depository
institutions in Idaho and Montana, and in Pennsylvania, respectively. And Quincy (2021)
studies bank heterogeneity in California around the Great Depression by contrasting cities
with and without access to Bank of America branches.

2.1

Bank Structure

Much bank heterogeneity stems from one-time or infrequent decisions about the nature and
structure of depository institutions (Greenbaum et al., 2019). Generally these decisions are
discrete and last multiple years, although they can change over time. Either way, these
decisions lead to heterogeneity across banks that can exist across geographic areas as well.
Many decisions begin with initial start-up. Banks choose where to charter and establish their
geographic headquarters based on a number of factors, including state laws and regulations.
For example, some states chose policies to attract banks specializing in credit cards (Tsosie,
2017; Chatterji and Seamans, 2012). Banks also choose their state of charter (headquarter)
based on the role of their state’s regulators relative to the bank’s national regulator (FDIC,
OCC, Federal Reserve); regulator decisions lead to heterogeneity and can influence banks’
credit supply (Peek and Rosengren, 1995, 1996) and contribution to the real economy locally
and nationally (Berger and Roman, 2017; Danisewicz et al., 2018). Bank office locations
also depend on socio-economic and demographic factors that vary across states and regions
(Burkey and Simkins, 2004). In addition, banks choose their type of depository institution
(commercial bank or savings & loans association), and membership in the Federal Reserve,
decisions that can impact the cost of funding (Tokle and Tokle, 2000) and bank profitability
(Gilbert and Rasche, 1980), respectively.
Age and size contribute continuously to bank heterogeneity. Bank age depends on the
year of charter. Most U.S. banks are old (Berger et al., 2001), and the results in Dick (2008)
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suggest customer preference for mature banks can partly explain this fact. Bank age is
influenced by the pace of mergers and acquisitions, which varies across states. Given that
bank branching liberalization was not uniform across states (Collender and Shaffer, 2003),
it is not surprising that the compositions of states’ banks are not either. Other differences
include number of banks, share of bank operations in the state where it is headquartered
(Khan and Ozel, 2016), and financial depth (Abrams et al., 1999; Petach et al., 2021).
Bank size depends on productivity and business strategies, such as interstate branching and
entry to the national banking market. Larger banks tend to innovate more (Hannan and
McDowell, 1987; DeYoung et al., 2007) and have more access to national networks (Hannan,
2006; Park and Pennacchi, 2008), but also less access to, and less experience in, hard lending
technologies (Berger and Black, 2011). Formation of a bank holding company and engaging
in non-banking activities also affects the size (and scope) of banks.

2.2

Customers and Deposits

Heterogeneity also stems from banks’ deposit recruitment, which comprises two main choices.
First, banks must choose their customers: households (retail), firms (commercial), or both.
Conditional on their customer base, banks then decide what deposit accounts to offer and
how to price them. The composition of bank funding sources varies according to the demand
and pricing of types of deposit accounts by their customers. Hannan (2006) and Calem
and Carlino (1991) find that market population characteristics are determinants of deposit
account fees and the setting of deposit rates, respectively.
Given that different consumers have different preferences for deposits (Dick, 2008; Yankov,
2018; Diamond et al., 2021) and states have different demographic compositions (Marchand
and Olfert, 2013; Turner et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2005), one can expect differences in the
deposit liability composition of banks in different areas.3 The same intuition applies for the
impact on bank funding of regional heterogeneity in non-financial industry characteristics.
3

For specific age differences across states, see the Population Reference Bureau Webpage.
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Business Labor Statistics (2020) reports variation in shares and trends of employment by
industry across states, while Chanda and Panda (2016) report differences in human capital
and multifactor productivity (MFP) across states from 1980 to 2007.
Banks’ customer and deposit product decisions are made jointly with its decision to
compete in a single market or multiple markets for deposit recruitment. Radecki (1998)
and Biehl (2002) analyze the choices banks of different size make between competing in
metropolitan areas and entire state and the effects on deposit rates; Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve (2003) and Hannan (2006) analyze the related choice between singleversus multi-state markets.

2.3

Income Generation

Variation in bank strategies to generate income from their assets also contributes to heterogeneity. Traditionally, the largest categories of bank assets are government securities, which
vary by maturity, and loans, which vary based on customer (retail versus commercial),
collateral (secured versus unsecured), borrower or project risk (varying degrees), maturity
(varying lengths), securitization (holding or selling loans), and other factors. Nonetheless,
some banks have transitioned to providing less-traditional banking services. Hence, banks
have two main sources of income: interest revenue and revenue from fees for deposit and
other non-loan non-traditional services (also called non-interest revenue).
Banks vary in their mix of income sources and performance. For instance, Berger et al.
(2016) find that banks in which lower-level managers hold more shares have higher tail
risk in non-interest income, and DeYoung and Torna (2013) find that asset-based nontraditional activities like investment banking and venture capital services significantly increase
the probabilities of bank failures. Heterogeneity among banks across states also arises due
to other loan-related factors. Driscoll (2004) and Khan and Ozel (2016) document regional
differences in loan portfolio information, while Samolyk (1994) and Ghosh (2017) focus on
regional differences in non-performing loans. Shim (2019) provides evidence of the presence

7

of variation in loan portfolio diversification across U.S. banks.

2.4

Geography

States and geographic regions exhibit heterogeneity that almost surely influences bank decisions and characteristics that contribute to bank heterogeneity as well. Heterogeneity
in demographic characteristics influences the types of retail depositors and loan customers
banks serve. Likewise, heterogeneity in industrial characteristics influences the types of
commercial depositors and loan customers banks serve. For instance, Ghosh (2015) show
that state characteristics, such as greater capitalization, liquidity risks, poor credit quality,
among others, impact bank loan performance. Mencken and Tolbert (2018), despite only
focusing on Texas, show that variation in business loan allocation can arise due to geographic
differences in borrower demographics. Shiers (2002) emphasizes the importance of geographical economic diversification in reducing bank risk. Together, these forms of heterogeneity
produce heterogeneous growth (long-run) and, to a lesser extent, business cycle fluctuations
(short-run).
Heterogeneous agents certainly contribute to regional economic diversity. For instance,
average household years of schooling varies across states and is an important determinant of
state economic growth (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). Furthermore, state business composition is relevant. Weinstein (2014), Decker et al. (2020), and Gilje (2019) show that shocks to
energy and other natural resource markets often have large state- and region-specific effects
in the medium-run growth, and some have direct consequences for banking (Plosser, 2015;
Gilje et al., 2016).4 States also exhibit heterogeneous responses to monetary policy (Fratantoni and Schuh, 2003; Eichenbaum et al., 2022), COVID policies (James et al., 2021), and
lagged regional conditions Wang (2021), including housing Bord et al. (2021). Thus, banks
in different states are both affected by state-level heterogeneity and by how they tailor their
business strategies to the heterogeneous economic conditions within a state.
4

Decker et al. (2020) finds the Appalachia to be one of the states that experienced experienced lower
employment growth given the fracking innovation.
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2.5

Real Economic Effects

Documenting the uniqueness of WV banks is a prerequisite to assessing whether uniqueness
affects the real economy in West Virginia. This crucial topic is large and complex, thus
beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive recent treatment and list of references,
see Berger et al. (2020). An illustrative but far-from-exhaustive list of examples of specific
channels through which banking affects the real economy includes: financial depth and mix
of intermediaries, bank balance-sheet conditions, loan supply, loan-loss provisions, nonperformance of loans, liquidity provision, and response to monetary and response to policy
implementation.

3

Data

The primary data source is micro data on U.S. banks insured by the FDIC and collected for
regulatory oversight. FDIC-insured banks are depository institutions classified as a commercial bank or a saving institutions (savings banks and savings associations), which constituted
91 percent of retail banking deposits in 2017.5 The bank financial data come from three
standard sources: the Summary of Depository Institutions (SDI); the regulatory Report of
Condition and Income, or Call Reports (CR); and the Summary of Deposits (SOD). The
analyses mainly use balance sheet and income statement data in the SDI and CR. As is
well-known, one of the limitations of these banking data sets is the lack of data on deposit
and loan interest rates. FDIC-insured branches of foreign banks are dropped for simplicity
and lack of consolidated data on their foreign banks. Other historical data come from the
FDIC’s BankFind Suite.6

5

The other 9 percent of deposits are held by an approximately equal number of credit unions regulated
by the NCUA. Credit unions also are depository institutions offering similar financial services but smaller
and less diverse than commercial banks. They are excluded from the analysis due to their different profit
status (non-profit), ownership structure (deposit shareholders), and business strategy (e.g., low fees and
higher deposit rates). Heterogeneity across states’ credit unions may also worth investigating, but credit
unions likely are more homogeneous across states.
6
See https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/
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Following Radecki (1998), Khan and Ozel (2016), and Liu et al. (2020), each bank’s
state is defined as the one in which it is headquartered (including the District of Columbia,
thus 51). This definition works well for banks operating branches only in one state but is
complicating for banks operating branches in multiple states. Financial statements are only
available at the consolidated bank level, so most balance sheet and income activity cannot
be apportioned by state. Deposit liabilities in the SOD data are available at the branch level
by state and used where necessary to identify activity in one state by a bank headquartered
in another state. These limitations mean that financial data for banks operating in multiple
states may not be well aligned with their headquarter state. We address this well-known
limitation with robustness checks using the subsample of banks operating in one state only.
The regressions also include indicators for state-level socioeconomic characteristics. Regional data come from a few standard government sources: the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (real personal income and population); the St. Louis Fed’s FRED (labor statistics); and the U.S. Census Bureau’s yearly estimates from the American Community Survey
(ACS) (remaining variables). Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provides full details of the
definitions and sources for these and all other variables used in the paper.

3.1

Transformations

Data from banks’ financial statements are transformed to percent shares to enhance comparison of banks with enormous differences in size (measured by dollar values of assets or
deposits) in common terms of allocation of sources and uses of funds. Let i = {1, ..., 5777}
index banks headquartered in state s = {1, ..., 51}. The balance sheet contains assets, Ais ,
and liabilities, Lis , related by the identity

Ais = Lis + Eis = L∗is
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where E denotes shareholders’ equity or bank capital. The income statement contains revenues, Ris , and operating costs (expenses), Cis , related by the identity

Yis = Ris − Cis

where Yis is the bank’s net income or profits. Each line-item element of a financial statement
∗

is indexed by j = {1, . . . , J k } line items, where k = {A, L∗ , R, C}; note that J L = J L + 1
because equity is a single line item. Bank-level aggregate components of the balance sheet
P A
and income statement are the sum over all j line items (for example, Ais = Jj=1 Ajis and
likewise for L∗is , Ris , and Cis . Dividing each line item by its component aggregate value and
multiplying by 100 yields the vector of percentage shares. For example,

A~is = [a1is , a2is , . . . , aJ A is ]

where a1is = (A1is /Ais ) × 100, and likewise for L~∗is , R~is , and C~is . Elements of L~∗is are divided
by Ais .
State- and U.S.-level aggregate financial shares are obtained by summing across all banks
headquartered in a state and across all U.S. banks, respectively. For example, the state- and
U.S.-level aggregate assets are:

As =

X

Ais and A =

51
X

5,777

As =

X

s=1

i∈s

Ais

i=1

Aggregate state and U.S. share vectors for each component of the balance sheet and income
statement are calculated analogously to the bank-level shares. These aggregate shares represent size-weighted averages of all banks in the state or nation and thus can be interpreted
as the share of a representative bank in the state or nation.
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4

Banks and Markets

This section provides evidence on the number and size of WV banks compared to US*
banks. It also defines a state’s banking market, describes the types of banks operating in
them, and provides evidence of heterogeneity across states’ banking markets. Except for
standard measures of deposit concentration, the paper does not undertake a formal analysis
of market competition.

4.1

Banks

The U.S. banking industry has been undergoing a comprehensive restructuring depicted
in Figure 1a. Since the 1980s, the number of banks has been declining steadily due to
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions stemming from the relaxation of interstate
banking regulations (Aguirregabiria et al., 2016), technological changes (Alessandrini et al.,
2009), and bank failures for other reasons. Although consolidation of WV banks has been
qualitatively similar to other U.S. banks, it has been greater and faster in West Virginia.
Despite experiencing greater consolidation, WV banks still exhibit striking differences
from US* banks, as shown in Figure 1b. West Virginia has 77 percent more banks per
capita (31 versus 18 per million residents) and 21 percent more branches (27 versus 22 per
$ million assets) than US* banks. Relatedly, the average WV bank is about one-fifth the
size of US* banks ($0.6 versus $3.0 billion) and WV banks hold a nearly one-third higher
share of in-state deposits (64.5 versus 49.4 percent). These differences suggest WV banks
are less efficient—more banks and branches mean higher overhead costs; smaller size impacts
provision of competitive services and rates; and greater reliance on in-state deposits reflects
limitations on the number and types of customers.
Whatever the reason(s), WV banks are less profitable, as can be seen in Figure 2. From
2012-2017, the asset-weighted return on assets (ROA) for US* banks was higher than that
of WV banks by about .10 percentage points on average. Relatedly, Minuci (2022) estimates
that WV banks are around 15 percent less cost efficient than the average bank. Interestingly,
12

WV banks fared much better than US* banks during the Financial Crisis and Great Recession
of 2007-2009 despite holding about twice as high a share of real estate loans. The ROA of
WV banks declined only about .50 percentage points (quarterly rate) compared to more
than 1.25 percentage points for US* banks, perhaps because WV banks were less likely to
participation in shadow banking activities associated with the Crisis.

4.2

Markets

Defining the geographic market in which a bank operates is challenging given non-uniform
consolidation across states and heterogeneous technological development across banks. Before interstate banking, state boundaries were a sensible definition, although banks in large
states may not have operated in all cities or counties of the state. Now, however, a bank
that operates branches in multiple states may have a diverse presence across states, some of
which may not even be geographically contiguous. And banks may locate their headquarters
in a state due to tax policies or other factors rather than primarily due to banking conditions
in that state.
Furthermore, technological innovations such as the Internet (online banking, non-bank
financial services, etc.) and cellar phones (mobile banking) reduced frictions due to geographic distance from banks and enabled “branchless banking” (Alessandrini et al., 2009).
Technological innovations made it possible for any bank to attract and serve customers from
across the nation instead of relying only on customers in their own geographic location.
Limited information on customer location in the banking data makes it even more difficult
to accurately define banking markets.
Nevertheless, state borders still reflect important differences in bank operating conditions,
such as: banking regulations; non-financial business regulations and practices; industrial
composition, household demographic composition; and population density. Despite technological advancements, the banking literature still emphasizes the importance of borrowerlender proximity to consumers’ utility and bank lending behavior. Dick (2008) discusses how
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consumer welfare increases the closer one is to its financial institution, while Adams et al.
(2021) emphasize that, except for a small share of large banks, business lender-borrower
distance has remained relatively constant in the past 20 years for individual banks.
For these reasons, this analysis uses state as the definition of a banking market, as noted
in Section 3. Radecki (1998) studies the geographic measurement of a bank’s market and
concludes that state borders are the best approximation to “the true marketplace for banking
services.” Khan and Ozel (2016) and Liu et al. (2020) also use states to determine a bank’s
local market and peers, respectively. Hannan (2006) highlights the importance of state
boundaries by discussing differences in the income and expense structure of banks operating
in one versus multiple states.
Combining bank and market definitions,“WV banks” are those headquartered in West
Virginia and US* banks are those headquartered in other states. Given increased interstate
banking activity, it is natural to further differentiate between banks operating branches only
in one state, “single-market banks” (SMBs), and banks operating branches in multiple states,
“multi-market banks” (MMBs).7 Because bank size is positively correlated with interstate
banking activity, MMBs are further divided into two groups based on an arbitrary but
empirically guided number of markets (states): small MMBs operate branches in fewer than
five states, and large MMBs operate branches in five or more states.
To quantify these concepts, Figure 3 illustrates the composition of US banks using a WV
map. In 2017, there were 5,777 banks. Only 57 were headquartered in West Virginia, of
which 40 were SMBs and 17 were MMBs (all small except one, WesBanco). Among banks
headquartered in US* but not operating in West Virginia, there were 5,044 SMBs and 582
MMBs. Comparing these two relatively similar market categories, West Virginia actually
has proportionately fewer SMBs relative to MMBs (70 percent versus 90 percent). The
remaining 94 banks are large US* MMBs: 17 operate branches in West Virginia and 77 do
7

This classification is similar to the one used by Park and Pennacchi (2008). An alternative classification
is based on the definition of community banking found in FDIC (2012) and used by Minuci (2022). However,
some community banks operate in multiple states, so this classification does not allow mutually exclusive
definitions of geographic markets.
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not.

4.3

Heterogeneity within West Virginia

The 74 banks operating branches in WV are quite diverse, as can be seen from the summary
statistics in Table 2. The 17 US* MMBs operating in West Virginia illustrate the high degree
of heterogeneity in state banking markets. The largest by far (JPMorgan Chase, or JPMC)
had nearly an order of magnitude more assets than any other bank.8 JPMC and eight other
US* MMBs, accounted for nine of the top 10 banks by assets operating in West Virginia.9
The two largest WV banks (WesBanco and United) were much smaller, ranking #10 and
#11 ($9.9 and $6.1 billion), respectively. On the other hand, WesBanco and United together
held 21 percent of WV deposits compared with about 29 percent for the largest nine US*
MMBs, so these 11 banks collectively account for 50 percent of the WV market. However,
each of the nine largest banks have WV deposit shares of about 3 percent or less compared
to 35 and 91 percent for the two largest WV banks.
The other 63 banks operating in WV are small players by comparison, regardless of their
headquarter location and structure. The largest (Woodforest) had only $5 billion in assets
and the 33 smallest each had less than $250 million. Only one (City National) held more
than 4 percent of WV deposits, and only one (The Farmers Bank, OH) did not have a large
majority of its deposits (26 percent) coming from within the state. The vast majority of
these banks were headquartered in West Virginia and focused their banking services there.
Despite popular perception, West Virginia clearly does not lack access to modern national
banking markets. One huge national bank and many regional banking giants have entered
the WV market. Along with the two largest WV banks, they form a large-bank in-state
market that offers any advanced modern banking services that WV households and firms
8

Curiously, JPMC was the only one the nation’s four largest commercial banks to have branches in West
Virginia. The other three (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank) all had more than $1.4 trillion in
assets in 2017, and Bank of America had branches in states contiguous to West Virginia.
9
Branch Banking and Trust (BB&T) and SunTrust merged in 2019. Their combined assets in 2017 would
have been $418 billion, second largest but still significantly smaller than JPMC.
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may demand. At the same time, another in-state market is characterized by a large number
of relatively small institutions that should provide any community-oriented banking services
demanded like small business lending.
Finally, the WV banking market does not exhibit initial evidence of a lack of competition.
One basic measure of competition in banking markets is the share of a state’s deposits held
by its largest banks. The top four banks operating in West Virginia held 44.5 percent of
state deposits in 2017 compared with 36.1 percent for the top four banks in the United
States. Thus, the WV banking market exhibits only slightly more concentration than the
U.S. banking market.10

4.4

Composition of Banks in Other States

Not surprisingly, banks in other states exhibit a diverse array of forms of uniqueness. Figure
4 illustrates the broad heterogeneity in the composition of banks across states by plotting
frequency distributions of several state-level characteristics. Most of these observable characteristics serve as controls in the regression analysis. The last four panels are the categories
of class variables omitted from the regressions.
The first two rows of Figure 4 contain the same four measures as in Figure 1b: the
number of banks and branches, bank size, and in-state deposit share. Most states have 20
or fewer banks per capita but some states have 80 or more banks per capita – more than
double West Virginia. Most states have far fewer branches per $1 billion of assets than West
Virginia (about 27), some as few as 10. Average bank size varies widely—many are well less
than $1 billion, but some are nearly $10 trillion (NOTE: x-axis is on a log scale with labels
in $ billions). The fraction of deposits held by banks headquartered in a state literally runs
nearly the entire range from 0 to 1.
10

A more formal measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) applied to state
deposit shares. The 4-bank HHI for West Virginia banks is 674.2 compared to 400.4 for all U.S. banks. The
HHI is a relatively simple measure of competition in a market, which is typically applied to the shares of
sales or revenue rather than deposits as in banking. An HHI of less than 1,500 is often considered indicative
of a competitive market, so by this measure there are not first-order concerns about market power in banking
at the WV state or national level.
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The remaining two rows of Figure 4 include the fractions of banks with various other
characteristics: 20-years or older, regulated by the FDIC, nationally chartered, and not part
of a bank holding company. Many states are dominated by older banks (share of more than
.80) while others have more younger banks (share of .50 or less). Most states have a minority
of banks not regulated by the Federal Reserve or OCC (shares of roughly .10 to .30) and
nationally chartered (mostly less than .25). The fraction of banks not in a bank holding
company varies from about .10 to .60.

5

Aggregate Financial Conditions

This section compares aggregate financial conditions in 2017 for WV and US* banks and for
banks classified by market types in each region. Differences between WV and US* banks
raise questions about the underlying cause(s) and motivate the regression analysis.

5.1

All Banks

At the most general level, WV and US* banks are roughly similar, as shown in Tables 3a
(balance sheet) and 3b (income statement). More than three-quarters (77-79 percent) of
liabilities are customer deposits, the main source of bank funds. Most deposits are nontransaction (57-60 percent), or saving. Equity capital is 11-12 percent. On the asset side,
loans account for the largest use of bank funds (55-70 percent) followed by Treasury securities
(18-21 percent). Cash and Other Assets each account for up to 11 percent of assets. The
income statement shows more than two-thirds (67-79 percent) of revenue comes from interest.
The largest component of interest income is from loans, which is not surprisingly given the
allocation of assets. In contrast, expenses are heavily concentrated (86-88 percent) in noninterest categories, nearly half of which is for salaries.
Upon closer inspection, however, WV banks exhibit two statistically and economically
significant differences in their balance sheets. In sources of funds, WV banks have 10 percentage points more domestic deposits (79 versus 69 percent), and their non-transaction deposits
17

are more heavily concentrated in time and other saving deposits (39 versus 26 percent). In
uses of funds, WV banks allocate more of their portfolio to loans (70 versus 55 percent) than
other assets (securities, repos, and other). Particularly striking is WV banks’ larger holdings
of real estate loans (56 versus 27), which is equally evident in residential and non-residential
categories.
The aggregate income statement shows WV banks also exhibit statistically and economically significant differences in revenue generation from their business models. WV banks earn
a higher proportion of revenue (79 versus 67 percent) from interest than non-interest income
(20 versus 32 percent). Not surprisingly, the difference in interest income mainly reflects WV
banks’ larger share of loans (especially real estate). The difference in non-interest income
does not stem from basic banking services but rather reflects WV banks’ lower revenue from
investment banking services and other non-interest income.11
To summarize thus far, WV banks are unique at least three ways: 1) deposit base; 2) asset
portfolio allocation; and 3) business model. WV deposits tend to be longer maturity, lower
risk, and lower cost (interest rate expense); these mainly reflect liquidity and risk preferences
of customers. Similarly, WV bank assets tend to be longer maturity, lower risk (secured), and
lower yield (interest income); these reflect customer loan demand and investment decisions
of managers. Thus, WV banks’ business model reflects the reliance on simpler, less-risky,
basic banking services. Almost surely, these differences are interrelated and enhance earlier
observations about restructuring, efficiency, and profitability of WV banks

5.2

Banks by Market Type

This subsection presents the financial conditions of WV and US* banks disaggregated by
the six market types defined in Section 4.2. For the remainder of the paper, we narrow the
11

Basic banking includes: service charges on deposit accounts and net servicing fees. Investment banking
includes: income from fiduciary activities; trading revenue; net securization income; sales of loans, leases,
real estate, and other assets; among others. Other non-interest income includes: income and fees from the
printing and sale of checks, earnings on/increase in value of cash surrender value of life insurance, income
and fees from ATMs, rent and other income from other real estate owned, etc. (see DeYoung and Torna,
2013, for example)

18

focus to the balance sheet. As Tables 3a and 3b show, assessments of the income statement
conditions are conceptually similar due to integration with the balance sheet through stockflow relationships defined by a bank’s business model.
Due to the large amount of information, balance sheet data are summarized graphically
for ease of comparison. Figures 5a and 5b each contains six panels of graphs in two rows
for WV (first) and US* (second). The two graphs in the first two columns juxtapose WV
and US* banks operating in comparable markets. The third column juxtaposes US* large
MMBs operating and not operating in West Virginia because there are no WV large MMBs.
Sources of funds for WV SMBs are unique in two respects, as shown in Figure 5a. First,
transactions deposits in WV SMBs (34 percent) are nearly double or more than in banks
with other market types. Second, the composition of non-transactions (savings) accounts
is significantly different for WV SMBs—only 7 percent of liabilities are in money market
deposit accounts (MMDA) compared with 29-37 percent for other market types. Relatedly,
WV SMBs have 39 percent of liabilities in time and other saving deposits, which is 10
percentage points or more higher than in other panels. Apparently, this striking result is
not a feature of single-market banks because US* SMBs have deposit shares similar to all
other markets—even large MMBs. Instead, customers of WV SMBs prefer different types of
deposits for some reason(s).
Variation in uses of funds across market types also reveals uniqueness in WV banks’ asset
allocation, as shown in Figure 5b. All banks headquartered in West Virginia (SMBs and
MMBs) hold more than half their assets (52-57 percent) in real estate loans. This share is
more than double that of all large MMBs (23 percent), regardless where they operate. US*
SMBs and MMBs have higher shares of real estate loans (31-40 percent), but still significantly
lower than WV banks, especially SMBs. WV SMBs also have lower shares of consumer loans
(4 versus 15 percent) and other loans (1 versus 4 percent) than US* SMBs. Interestingly,
the asset portfolio allocation of US* banks operating in WV is broadly similar to large US*
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MMBs not operating in WV.12 Apparently, banks do not specialize in real estate loans just
because they operate in West Virginia. Instead, managers of banks headquartered in West
Virginia apparently decide to specialize in real estate loans for some reason(s).
Figure 6 shows important heterogeneity in ROA among aggregate banking markets. During the expansion including 2017, the main difference in ROA between WV and US* banks
occurred among single-market banks. US* SMBs consistently earned a ROA of roughly 1/2
percentage point (50 basis points) higher than WV* SMBs. Over the same period, the ROA
of WV MMBs was roughly similar to that of US* MMBs for small and large MMBs. During the Financial Crisis and Great Recession, however, it was US* SMBs that experienced
the greatest decline in ROA whereas WV SMBs did not experience much decline in ROA.
This interesting cyclical difference in ROA across bank market types may merit additional
research.

6

Econometric Models

This section describes the models used to test the hypothesis that differences in the financial
conditions of WV banks can be explained solely by the composition of WV bank types.
The regression strategy follows an approach popularized in the international trade literature
by Bernard and Jensen (1999). We estimate heterogeneous state effects on banks’ financial
shares while controlling for a vector of exogenous, observable bank characteristics. If these
characteristics fully explain differences across states, then the cause of uniqueness in WV (or
another state) banks’ financial conditions lies in the evolution of cross-section variation in
states’ bank types. If not, heterogeneous bank financial conditions likely reflect endogenous
choices made by bank customers and managers that require further explanation.
Two types of econometric models are used to estimate state effects. One type is a basic
fixed-effects (FE) model, which provides estimates of the average financial conditions in
12

Bear in mind that this result includes JPMorgan Chase, which has an order of magnitude more assets
than any other bank in West Virginia as noted in Table 2.
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WV (or another state’s) banks and thus a measure of the uniqueness of banks in a state.
The other type is a mixed-effects (ME) model that contains random effects arising from
observable, state-level economic variables (controls) that are common to all banks in a state
and likely exogenous. For both models, the null hypothesis is that the state effects can be
explained solely by observable bank and/or regional characteristics.

6.1

Fixed-effect (FE) models

The fixed-effects models for each asset or liability share j of bank i headquartered in state
s are
ajis =

S
X

a
αjr
+ βja BAN Kis + εajis ∀ j ∈ J A

(1)

r=1

and
∗
ljis

=

S
X

∗

∗

∗

∗

l
αjr
+ βjl BAN Kis + εljis ∀ j ∈ J L

(2)

r=1
∗

l
a
and αjr
are the S state fixed-effect dummy variables indexed by subscript r, and
where αjr

there is no constant. BAN Kis is a vector of bank-specific, predetermined explanatory variables that contains five categorical variables (# of categories) representing characteristics
determined infrequently by banks: class (5), holding-company ownership structure (3), government regulator (2), age (3), and market type (3). BAN Kis also contains two continuous
variables: log of the number of branches and the lagged loan charge-off rate, which is predetermined and an important determinant of asset allocation (see DeYoung et al., 2015).13
Although these explanatory variables are endogenously determined in the long run, they are
essentially exogenous relative to current financial decisions made by the bank in the short
run or lagged and thus predetermined.
The financial shares sum to 100 percent, so the regression models form a linearly depen-

13

See Appendix A for descriptions of the data and regression variables.
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dent system of equations. The asset share equations are

a1is =
a2is =

S
X
r=1
S
X

a
α1r
+ β1a BAN Kis + εa1is

a
α2r
+ β2a BAN Kis + εa2is

r=1

..
.
. = ..
S
X
aJ A is =
αJa A r + βJaA BAN Kis + εaJ A is ,
r=1

which are linearly dependent by virtue of being percent shares, so akis = (1 −

P

j6=k

ajis ).

∗
The system for ljis
is specified analogously.

Two variants of the FE model are estimated. The FE(2) model contains fixed effects for
∗

WV and US*, α = [αW V αU S ], that correspond to the aggregate financial shares reported
in Table 3a. This specification provides an efficient test of the uniqueness of WV banks from
US* banks. FE(51) contains a fixed effect for each of the 51 states. This more regionally
disaggregated specification enables identification of specific states with banks that may: 1)
be similar to WV banks; or 2) exhibit different forms of uniqueness than WV banks.

6.2

Mixed-effects (ME) models

Although FE models identify average bank financial shares by state, Section 2 and Table 1
suggest that regional variation in state-level economic activity also may contribute to crossstate heterogeneity in banking behavior. However, adding state-level (aggregate) variables
such as state real GDP per capita to bank-level FE model regressions causes downward bias
in standard errors that requires ex post correction (for example, see Moulton, 1990). The
problem stems from lack of variation in aggregate data across banks within a state, which
imparts an error to the state fixed effect: αs = α0 + ηs . The state-level random error ηs
is correlated with BAN Kis and thus violates the Gauss-Markov assumption underlying the
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FE regression (see also Hausman and Taylor, 1981; Bafumi and Gelman, 2006).14
To address this problem, we use a multi-level mixed-effects (ME) model that explicitly
specifies regional variation in the intercepts of equations (1) and (2).15 Suppressing unnecessary notation, the ME model for asset j is

ais = α0 + γs Zs + β a BAN Kis + ais

(3)

where α0 is a constant intercept for all states, Zs is the design matrix containing state-level
variables, and γs captures the random state effects that are uncorrelated with ais . The design
matrix can include two types of state-level variables:

γs Zs = γ S ST AT Es + γ B BAN K s

(4)

where ST AT Es is a vector of non-bank state-level variables and

BAN Ks = (1/Ns )

X

BAN Kis

i∈s

is a vector of average bank characteristics for a state with Ns banks. Without a structural
theoretical model for guidance, it is difficult to form strong a priori beliefs about the most
suitable variables for ST AT Es and BAN K s , but both should be plausibly exogenous to
individual bank decisions. Most natural candidates for ST AT Es are likely to be outside the
control of the bank, even if it is very large. Candidates for BAN Ks may be outside the
control of banks unless one (or more) exhibits market power.

14

An alternative approach that can avoid this concern is shown by DePrice et al. (2011), who study
whether different socioeconomic and market structure factors impact bank returns aggregated at the state
level. However, their approach significantly reduces the number of observations in the model.
15
See Gelman et al. (2008) for analogous application in political science. We thank Marcin Hitzcenko for
introducing us to this methodology and application.
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6.3

Estimation

The FE(2) and FE(51) models of systems of equations (1) and (2) are estimated equation-byequation with OLS. The FE(2) regressions are weighted by banks’ total assets to match the
aggregate data in Table 3a. The FE(51) regressisons are unweighted, but the fitted values
are weighted by banks’ share of assets in their state when constructing state-level fitted
values. Because the FE systems are linearly dependent, one of the estimated equations can
be derived from estimates of all other equations. However, because each dependent variable
equation has identical explanatory variables, OLS estimation of all equations is consistent
and state effects should be unbiased in finite samples.16
The FE(2) models are estimated to test whether the quantitative differences in average
financial shares of WV and US* banks are statistically significant after controlling for indi∗

vidual bank characteristics (BAN Kis ). The null hypothesis tested is H0 : αW V = αU S , a
standard coefficient restriction that produces an F-statistic.17 Rejection of the null indicates
that WV banks’ financial conditions are unique from other US banks for reasons beyond
the composition of bank types in the state. Estimated fixed effects should be comparable
to the the data in Table 3a but won’t be exactly the same due to the controls and random
variation. Results include the data from Table 3a for comparison.
The ME models are estimated with maximum likelihood and standard errors are clustered
at the state level.18 Although the random state effects are not estimated directly, Jiang (1997)
shows they can be derived using the best linear unbiased predictions (BLUP),

γ
bs = CV −1 (ais − βb BAN Kis ),

16

(5)

See Theil (1971) for more details about the system estimation and Schuh and Stavins (2010) for an
example of this approach applied to shares of consumers’ use of payment instruments. The systems could be
estimated using seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) to obtain more precise standard errors,
but gains would be modest given the number of observations and precision of OLS estimates.
17
Although the regressions are weighted by bank size, we still use the “white.adjust” option of the linearHypothesis command in R for a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test.
18
We use the STATA command mixed to estimate the model.
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where C = Cov(γ, ais ), V −1 is the inverse of the Var(ais ), and βb the vector of estimated
coefficients from BAN Kis . Comparing γ
bs with estimated state effects from the FE(51)
model quantifies the extent to which state-level variables influence bank heterogeneity beyond
individual bank characteristics. ME and FE(51) state effects provide evidence on the extent
and nature of bank uniqueness not only in West Virginia but all other states too.
In this paper’s model specification, candidates for BAN K s are limited by the fact that
most are dummy variables with low variance over time. The few continuous variables are not
particularly well-suited to capturing regional economic activity broadly. State-level average
bank branches is unlikely to matter much for banks financial shares. State-level average
default rates are a potentially important part of regional financial conditions and thus more
promising, but this measure is less likely to be exogenous to banks. For these reasons, the
ME models exclude BAN K s .
We rely on the literature to guide selection of ST AT Es variables for the ME models. With
regard to demand for deposits, Yankov (2018) shows that age is an important characteristics
of depositors who hold certificates of deposits (CDs). Angrisani et al. (2020) confirms that
consumers’ financial sophistication is associated with age in addition to educational attainment and race. CDs provide fixed income for older consumers, plus they are relatively simple
and safe saving vehicles. Hence, the ME model for time deposits includes: 1) state share of
population above 62 years old; and 2) share of population that earned at least a high school
degree. With regard to demand for real estate loans, Goodman and Mayer (2018) mentions
the importance of borrower’s age and house price (and appreciation) in home ownership
decisions. Hence, the ME model for real estate loans includes: 1) population median age;
and 2) the ratio of median house value to personal income.
For robustness, we estimated the ME models with a host of other variables in ST AT Es
and found the estimates of γ
bs generally to be robust. Alternative specifications of ST AT Es
do not alter significantly the overall contributions of γ
bs (magnitudes or signs), which turn
out to be modest anyway, as shown in Section 7. However, the relative contributions of each
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state-level variable can vary quantitatively across specifications. Including a third variable
in ST AT Es stresses the estimation in this particular data sample, so the ML estimation
often fails to converge or produces nonsensical results. All together, the findings suggest
that while the ME model is appropriate theoretically, it has limits in this application and
affects economic inference modestly.19
The FE and ME econometric models implicitly assume the effects of observable bank
∗

characteristics on financial activity (β a and β l ) are the same for all banks regardless of
state. For example, bank age is correlated with financial shares identically for WV and
US* banks (or for all 51 states). Thus, estimated ME models only have random intercepts,
not random slopes. This assumption seems like a reasonable starting point absent obvious
economic reasons to expect otherwise, but it may be worth relaxing in future research.
Data used in estimation are for 2017:Q2. Each regression uses the full sample of U.S.
banks described in Section 3, both SMBs and MMBs. Because MMBs have activity outside
the headquarter state, sometimes a large share of the consolidated bank activity, combining
all banks may a give misleading picture of heterogeneity across states. Thus, for robustness,
we also estimated the FE and ME models using subsamples containing only SMBs to identify
the influence of multi-market banking on heterogeneity. The SMB subsample results were
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to estimates with all banks.20

7

Estimation Results

This section reports estimation results for the models described in Section 6. The first
subsection describes FE(2) model estimates of the entire systems of sources (liabilities plus
equity) and uses (assets) of funds. Based on the FE(2) model results, the second subsection
describes ME model estimates for two of the most relevant, interesting, and interrelated
19

A non-exhaustive list of alternative variables used in ST AT Es includes real personal income, real median
house price, unemployment rate, employment growth, population growth, household debt-to-income ratio,
and level of education. Results for alternative specifications are available upon request.
20
Results for estimation with the SMB subsamples are available on request.
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balance sheet line items—time deposit and real estate loan shares. It also compares and
contrasts estimates of state heterogeneity from the ME and FE(51) models.

7.1

FE(2) Model

Tables 4 through 6 report estimates of three systems of equations for sources of funds (liabilities plus equity), uses of funds (assets), and components of real estates loans, respectively.21
∗

Each table contains estimates of αW V and αU S followed by regression diagnostics. The
first two diagnostics are raw data shares from Table 3a for comparison with estimated fixed
∗

effects.22 The next diagnostic row is the p-value for H0 : αW V = αU S ; values of .10 or less
indicate that financial conditions of WV banks are unique at conventional statistical levels.
The F.E. contribution is the percentage of adjusted R2 explained by the fixed effects alone,
which quantifies the extent to which observable bank characteristics explain cross-state heterogeneity in financial conditions.23
After controlling for bank characteristics, WV banks continue to exhibit some unique
non-transaction deposit liabilities, as shown in Table 4. Fixed effects for WV banks’ MMDA
and time deposit shares remain economically different from US* banks (10 percentage points
lower and 6 percentage points higher, respectively) and statistically different at the 5 percent
level or better. Fixed effects explain most of the MMDA share (86 percent), but controls
explain only one-third (32 percent) of heterogeneity in time deposits. Although not statistically significant at conventional levels, WV banks also have higher shares of transaction
deposits (4-1/2 percentage points), some of which are not interest-bearing.
After controlling for bank characteristics, WV banks’ also continue to exhibit unique
asset portfolios, as shown in Table 5. Fixed effects for WV banks’ real estate loans are 15
21

The real estate loan shares use total assets as the denominator and thus will not sum to 100 but rather
to the share of real estate loans instead.
22
Recall that while the fixed effects may differ somewhat from the data due to the presence of the controls
and random variation, the sums of fixed effects in each row equal approximately 100 percent due to the linear
dependence.
23
F.E. contributions are calculated as the ratio of adjusted R2 from the (unreported) regressions without
controls (BAN Kis ) to the reported adjusted R2 for the full regression.
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percentage points higher than US* banks—an economically large and highly statistically
significant difference. Controls explain only one-third (36 percent) of heterogeneity in real
estate loans. WV banks’ share of other loans also is statistically significantly different (4
percent points lower than US* banks), but these loans are a much smaller share of assets for
all banks.
Because real estate loans can be quite heterogeneous, it is informative to explore the
greatest quantitative uniqueness of WV banks at a deeper level. Table 6 reports estimates
for the system of equations comprising the individual components of real estate shares.
After controlling for bank characteristics, WV banks are most unique in lending for smaller
residential properties. Fixed effects for WV banks’ loans for 1-4 unit (family) residential
real estate are 13 percentage points higher than US* banks, which accounts for the largest
portion of the difference in total real estate loan shares. Controls explain two-fifths (59
percent) of heterogeneity.
Overall, the FE(2) model estimates demonstrate that state bank composition, as measured by observable bank characteristics, does not fully explain economically significant
differences in financial behavior between WV and US* banks. WV banks exhibit two key
statistically significant differences—higher shares of time deposits (lower shares of MMDAs),
and higher shares of real estate loans, especially for small residential properties. These two
key differences are likely related through qualitative asset transformation (QAT) and related
properties of interest rate risk.24

7.2

ME and FE(51) Model

This subsection investigates whether the FE(2) results are robust to controlling for statelevel economic conditions and expanding the scope beyond West Virginia to see if other
states have unique banks. At first glance, the heat map in Figure 7a does not show a clear

24

We thank Christina Wang for pointing out this connection to us.
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regional pattern in real estate shares, but two general observations are apparent.25 First,
banks in most states west of the Mississippi River have relatively low real estate shares. The
Northwest (WA, OR) is a clear exception; states along the northern border (MO, ND, and
MN) and in the southeast corner (AR and LA) of the Western region also have relatively
high shares. A second observation is that states east of the Mississippi River tend to have
higher real estate shares but also high variance across states. Banks in some states in the
northeast (Mason-Dixon line and north) have among the highest shares, especially parts of
the mid-Atlantic (WV, MD, NJ) and New England (VT, NH, ME). However, others in this
area have relatively low shares. States in the southeast have similar, though less dramatic,
variation: SC and FL have relatively high shares, while others are relatively low.26
Rather than presenting another heat map for time deposits, Figure 7b depicts the scatter
plot of the empirical relationship between state-level shares of real estate loans and time
deposits. As might be expected, there is a clear positive correlation (.64) between them. A
15-percentage-point increase in the time deposit share (from 5 to 20 percent) is associated
with an increase of about 30 percentage points in the real estate loan share (roughly 20
to 50 percent). This cross-section correlation reflects an economically large and potentially
important connection that suggests banks’ business strategies vary across states in a way
that merits further investigation. For this reason, we narrow the econometric analysis to
focus on estimates of the shares of real estate loans and time deposits.
Table 7 reports estimates of the ME and FE(51) models for the two shares. Unlike the
results for the FE(2) model, the focus is not on matching the state effects (fixed or random)
to the aggregate data. Instead, the main results of interest are the estimated BAN Kis
controls and overall model fit (regression diagnostics).
25

Recall that these loan data are for the consolidated bank attributed to the state of its headquarters,
so these shares may not accurately reflect the actual shares for all loan customers’ state of residence or the
geographic location of the property.
26
The real estate shares have roughly similar regional patterns when disaggregated by banking market
(SMB, MMB small, and MMB large). The difference is most pronounced for SMBs, where some states have
few of those banks. However, the correlation of the state real estate asset shares between SMBs and all
banks (depicted in Figure 7a) is still .76.
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Most estimates of βb are statistically significant in both models for both shares. For real
estate, shares are notably lower for large MMBs and higher for younger banks (20 years
or less). Banks with more branches and banks regulated by the FDIC also have higher
real estate shares. Bank class and holding-company status affect real estate loan shares
significantly as well. For time deposits, the bank controls have smaller and more uniform
(in absolute value) effects. Interestingly, loan charge-off rates are not significant for either
variable or model. Overall, the magnitude and significance of the controls is quite similar
across models.
Both models fit the data reasonably well according to their respective diagnostics. The
adjusted R2 for the FE(51) models are moderately larger than for the FE(2) models (5 and 9
percentage points for loans and deposits, respectively), so gains from increased heterogeneity
in fixed effects are non-trivial. FE contributions to the unweighted FE(51) model (.76.85) are much larger than to the weighted FE(2) model (.32-.36). Apparently, cross-section
heterogeneity in asset size is a non-trivial part of the explanatory power of BAN Kis controls.
ME models with two random effects are estimated significantly, as indicated by the low
p-values from the null hypothesis of zero random effects, and they each have non-trivial
standard deviations. The standard deviation of the random state effects is about 37 percent
larger for real estate loans.
To evaluate overall model performance, Figure 8 plots fitted values of the ME and FE(51)
models for each state against the actual data. States appear in ascending order of each
empirical financial share to assist comparison of model fit by magnitude, so the ordering of
states differs across panels. Fitted values of the ME models (orange bars) are constructed as
∗

∗
∗
b
ajs = ajs − b
ajs and b
ljs
= ljs
−b
ljs , where j is real estate loans and time deposits, respectfully.
∗
For comparison, the figures also include analogous estimates of b
ajs and b
ljs
from the FE(51)

models. Thus, fitted values of the ME model reflect BAN Kis and ST AT Es controls, while
fitted values of the FE(51) model reflect BAN Kis controls and 51 fixed state effects.
The top panel of Figure 8 reveals widespread heterogeneity in shares of real estate loans
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and accuracy of the models’ fitted values. Most states have loan shares of 35-55 percent.
Several states have larger shares than West Virginia, five of them exceeding 60 percent (four
in New England plus NJ). Eight states have shares below 35 percent but no clear geographic
pattern except the two lowest (NV and UT are less than 15 percent). The ME and FE(51)
models fit loan shares reasonably well in states above the median, but markedly less well in
states with lower shares (especially below 25 percent). In this sense, banks in states with
unusually low real estate loan shares are perhaps more unique than WV banks.
Figure 8 also reveals considerable heterogeneity in shares of time deposits and accuracy
of the models’ fitted values in the bottom panel. Most states have deposit shares of 5-20
percent, which is less variation and a somewhat more linear progression than for real estate
loans. The time deposit models differ from the real estate models in two ways. First, the
larger errors are spread across all magnitudes of the data rather than one end of the empirical
range. Second, some of the time deposit errors are much larger – especially in NV, DE, and
ME – but overall the time deposits model fits better on average across all values.
Comparing both panels of Figure 8 reveals that the ME and FE(51) models fit the data
about equally well. The cross-state standard deviation of the two models’ prediction errors
is essentially the same for the real estate model (9.37 versus 9.38). But the ME model fits
the time deposits better than the FE(51) model (standard deviations of 3.81 versus 5.52,
respectively). Thus, while the ME model provides a proper econometric treatment of the
ST AT Es controls, it does not improve the fitted values of the FE(51) model uniformly across
financial variables or by an economically significant degree in magnitude. The qualitative
conclusions are the same for both models.
Figures 9a and 9b plot the BLUP random state effects decomposed into relative contributions (stacked bars) of each ST AT Es variable. In this figure, the data are arranged
by region rather than ascending order to better assess geographic patterns. Vertical lines
denote the Census Bureau’s four regions (black) and nine divisions (gray) with states listed
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approximately West to East and clockwise within regions.27
Random state effects for both financial shares exhibit some loose regional patterns but
magnitudes vary widely and inconsistently within and between regions. Most random effects for real estate loans range (in absolute value) around 0-15 percentage points, but for
time deposits only about 0-10 percentage points. Both of the state-level variables make an
economically significant contribution to the full random effect in each ME model. For real
estate shares, contributions of the ratio of median house price to income tends to be larger (in
absolute value) than those of population median age. For time deposit shares, contributions
of age (percent ≥ 62 years old) tend to be slightly lower (in absolute value) than those of
a customer base with lower education attainment, which is proxied by the population share
that has earned a high school degree or less. In both cases, we find that a geographic pattern
emerges where the random effects positively impacts real estate and time deposit shares of
Eastern states, while negatively impacting Western states. Further exploration of the role
of regional economic factors may be a fruitful line of future research.

7.3

Correlation with the Real Economy

The regression results confirm that the empirical uniqueness of WV banks’ shares of time
deposits and real estate loans cannot be explained fully by observable bank characteristics
or state-level economic variables. What remains to be discovered is an answer to the more
complex question motivating this paper: Are WV banks—or other states’ banks—unique in
a manner that affects the state’s real economy? The full answer lies beyond the scope of this
paper, but it is instructive to see whether there might be any evidence to motivate additional
research. For this purpose, Table 8 reports cross-state correlations of time deposits and real
estate loans with a range of real economic variables for the 51 states in 2017.28
27

The nine Census regions are: Pacific (#9, five states); Mountain (#8, eight); West North Central (#4,
seven); East North Central (#3, five); Middle Atlantic (#2, three); New England (#1, six); South Atlantic
(#5, nine); East South Central (#6, four); and West South Central (#7, four).
28
Although not all correlations in Table 8 are statistically significant, pooling data across years strengthens
them. Most correlations become significant when using three or more years of data (e.g., 2016-2018).
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Both financial shares have economically and statistically significant correlation each other
(.64) and with C&I loans (about −0.25). This result suggests that these variables should
be modeled jointly in a more general model. The financial shares also have some economically and statistically significant correlations with real variables across states. Although not
significantly correlated with growth in real GDP growth per capita or level, the negative
correlation with population growth is non-trivial (about −.2). Time deposits are correlated
negatively and significantly with wealth (median house price growth), unemployment, and
credit card delinquency. These correlations may reflect predominantly business cycle effects
on deposits rather than vice versa. However, both financial shares have economically large
and statistically significant negative correlation with the growth of firms in a state and the
concentration (HHI) of bank deposits. The former is a key indicator of healthy real growth
in a state; the latter suggests a possible connection between banking competition and the
real economy.
Of course, the correlations in Table 8 do not necessarily reveal causation in either direction between the financial conditions of banks and the real state economies. Nevertheless,
the presence of economically large and (in some cases) statistically significant correlations
suggests there may be a relationship to discover and perhaps causation. For this analysis,
more sophisticated structural modeling and econometric analyses are needed.

8

Discussion and Research Directions

To some extent, the principles of QAT rationalize the observed correlation between time
deposit and real estate shares across states. Given variation in shares of deposits by type,
banks with longer maturity deposits have lower interest risk and thus might allocate more
assets to longer maturity loans. However, QAT alone does not fully explain the magnitude
of the correlation or its cross-section (state-level) distribution. So, the simple correlation
begs deeper, more complex questions about its origins in general equilibrium.
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8.1

Banking Services

Two unanswered questions pertain to the demand for financial intermediation. Why would
bank customers in some states choose to hold higher shares in time deposits than customers
in other states? And why would bank customers in some states be more likely to demand
real estate loans than customers in other states? A natural answer to both questions may
be heterogeneity among customers. For example, answers may differ for households versus
firms because each has a different optimization problem.
However, the heterogeneity answer begs the deeper question about its origins for both
types of customers and their geographic locations. Does it stem from differences in consumer
preferences for simple low-risk, low-return deposits (e.g., risk aversion), rationality (e.g.,
impatience), information deficiencies, financial skills (e.g., education), or other factors? If
so, why would these preferences vary geographically? Are these differences mainly observed
between bank customers (households versus firms) or within types of customers as well?
Firms may be more rational and/or less risk averse than households, but these differences
also could manifest across types of firms (e.g., small versus large). Firms also have different
production technologies and industries (output products) that sort by geography, at least to
some extent.
Analogous questions pertain to the supply of financial intermediation. Beyond QAT,
why would bank managers in some states hold asset portfolios that rely more heavily on
real estate loans with lower risk and return than managers in other states? Is this decision
driven or constrained by the local state economy somehow, or by the skills and professional
characteristics of bank managers (e.g., risk aversion about ROA), or both? Does the nature
of banking services adjust to the nature of the geographic character of its customers? If bank
managers in states with relatively high time deposit shares could earn higher risk-adjusted
returns from asset portfolios that were less dependent on real estate, then why don’t (or
can’t) those managers incentivize their customers to choose a different mix of deposits by
setting different interest rates and fees? Or perhaps the mix of deposits and loans is optimal
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for customers and the bank already?

8.2

Regional Banking

Modeling banking services ultimately requires analysis within the regional markets that
still epitomize the U.S. banking industry. Education, employment, income, and wealth
of households vary significantly across regions. Likewise, industry composition and firm
productivity levels vary significantly across regions. Most likely, households and firms do not
locate geographically to obtain regional banking services. Instead, regional heterogeneity in
household and firm customers likely impacts the level and nature of regional demand for
deposits and loans. Taking this reasoning one step further begs the question: Could it be
that bank managers, especially those in SMBs, reside in the same communities (states) as
their depositors and shareholders? If so, then perhaps bank managers share similar regional
tastes, preferences, skills and information? Or perhaps industry training of bank managers
leads them behave more uniformly across regional markets?
Geographic heterogeneity of customers requires modeling financial services in a regionally
disaggregated framework along with non-financial firms. To explain the correlation between
liability and asset sides of bank balance sheets in steady state, it is necessary to capture
the general equilibrium features that contribute to these joint decisions. Full understanding
of contemporary general equilibrium requires modeling the ongoing transitions of regional
banking markets prompted by interstate banking. Almost surely, states’ uniqueness is not the
result of random chance and time but rather the outcome of optimal interstate expansion by
banks as they moved from SMBs to MMBs then ultimately large national MMBs. Interstate
bank expansion plans almost surely took into account the uniqueness of state markets.
Finally, understanding banks’ specialization in real estate loans likely requires a structural
treatment of regional real estate development. Housing is widely viewed in the literature as
a local (regional) good by its very nature, and state home ownership rates range from 40-77
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percent (West Virginia is near the top at 75.3 percent).29 Commercial real estate is tied
closely to urban development and a region’s industrial composition. The same perspective
holds for states with banks that specialize more in commercial and industrial loans or other
assets. Incorporating these industry-specific factors is a necessary part of a full general
equilibrium treatment of banks’ joint decisions about deposits and loans.

8.3

Future Research

Results in this paper describe an intriguing but complex economic environment with heterogeneous agents, regions, and industrial sectors of financial and non-financial activity.
Modeling this environment may require some or all of the following elements. Banks need
a profit-maximizing framework for managers that includes deposit and loan choices by its
two customer types, households and non-financial firms, and roles for interstate growth and
dynamics. In addition to consumption, the utility maximization problem for households has
monetary (liquidity) and non-monetary (long-term saving and investment, including housing) management dimensions. The profit maximization problem for non-financial firms needs
a geographic production location decision in addition to standard financing requirements in
the short and long run. Non-financial firms may need industrial disaggregation and real
estate markets (residential and non-residential). Regional disaggregation is necessary but
may not required state-level detail. Together, these elements form an ambitious structural,
general equilibrium model that is well beyond the scope of this paper.

9

Conclusion

This paper investigates and describes differences in financial and economic behavior among
banks of different states. The results suggest that WV banks—mainly those headquartered in
the state—are unique in at least two, interrelated ways: 1) their customers prefer lower-risk,
lower-return, longer maturity deposits; and 2) their managers favor lower-risk, lower-return
29

Based on the Census annual home ownership data from 2013 to 2018.
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secured real estate loans in their asset portfolio allocations. QAT only partly explains this
finding. Some uniqueness stems from heterogeneity in customers and managers who reside in
West Virginia, and in the state economy, that drive deposit and asset management behavior.
Other states’ banks also exhibit interesting dimensions of uniqueness. This paper focuses
on heterogeneity in real estate loan shares across states, which are high for WV banks. But
West Virginia is not the only state with banks specializing in real estate loans, and other
states have less than half (25 percent less) the share of WV banks. These latter states are
unique in that they specialize in assets different from real estate loans, which broadens the
scope of uniqueness in banks. Further investigation is needed to discover why they make
such different portfolio allocation decisions based on their unique liability structures.
Uniqueness in banks’ time deposit and real estate loan shares across states is only partly
explained by heterogeneity in the composition of observable bank characteristics. Regional
(state-level) economic characteristics also contribute to heterogeneity in banks’ financial
behavior across states and must be controlled for using appropriate econometric methods
such as the mixed-effects model. However, while bank and state economic characteristics
vary widely across states, other factors related to depositor and bank manager behaviors
appear to be contributing to diversity in banking markets across states. More theory and
research is needed to better understand the general equilibrium factors at play in banks’
complex optimization problem.
The original motivation of the paper was to ask whether WV banks are unique and, if so,
whether that uniqueness might be related to differential economic growth in West Virginia.
This paper shows that uniqueness in banks’ unique financial behavior across states is correlated unconditionally with real economic activity in those states, but it cannot determine
causality. Thus, it is premature to draw conclusions about the magnitude and nature of
this financial-real correlation before gaining a better understanding of optimizing behavior
in the complex general equilibrium environment described in this paper. This task is important, especially for slow-growth states like West Virginia and others in Appalachia, and thus
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worthy of additional research.
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Figures
Figure 1a: Number of WV and US* Commercial Banks, 1932-2019

Figure 1b: Characteristics of WV and US* Banks, 2017
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Figure 2: Asset-weighted ROA for WV and US* Banks, 2009-2019

Figure 3: Composition of the WV Banking Market, 2017
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Figure 4: Distributions of State Bank Characteristics, 2017
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Figure 5a: WV and US* Bank Liabilities by Market, 2017

Figure 5b: WV and US* Bank Assets by Market, 2017
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Figure 6: Asset-Weighted ROA for WV and US* Banks by Market, 2007-2019
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Figure 7a: Shares of Real Estate Loans by State of Bank HQ, 2017

Figure 7b: Shares of Real Estate Loans versus Time Deposits, 2017
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Figure 8: Fitted Values of ME and FE(51) Models by State, 2017
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Figure 9a: Decomposition of Random Effects for Real Estate Loans, 2017

Figure 9b: Decomposition of Random Effects for Time Deposits, 2017
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Tables
Table 1: Economic Conditions in WV and US, 2017
WV
Population (millions)
1.8
5-year population growth (%)
−2.2
Age (share >62, %)
22.6
Real personal income per capita ($1,000) 42.0
Unemployment rate (%)
5.2
LF participation rate (%)
53.2
Home ownership rate (%)
75.1
Median existing home price ($1,000)
112
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US

WV–US

WV/US

325.0
3.6
18.3
49.0
4.4
62.9
63.9
194

−323.2
−5.7
4.3
−7.0
−0.8
−9.7
−11.2
−82

0.0056

0.86

0.58

Table 2: Characteristics of Banks Operating in West Virginia, 2017
Bank Name

HQ
(ST)
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
OH
PNC Bank, National Association
DE
Branch Banking and Trust Company
NC
SunTrust Bank
GA
Fifth Third Bank
OH
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. NY
The Huntington National Bank
OH
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC
First National Bank of Pennsylvania
PA
WesBanco Bank, Inc.
WV
United Bank
WV
Woodforest National Bank
TX
Community Trust Bank, Inc.
KY
City National Bank of West Virginia
WV
Peoples Bank
OH
First Community Bank
VA
Summit Community Bank, Inc
WV
MVB Bank, Inc
WV
First United Bank & Trust
MD
Premier Bank, Inc.
WV
The Ohio Valley Bank Company
OH
First Sentry Bank, Inc.
WV
New Peoples Bank, Inc.
VA
Putnam County Bank
WV
Clear Mountain Bank
WV
Huntington Federal Savings Bank
WV
Main Street Bank Corp.
WV
Bank of Charles Town
WV
Hancock County Savings Bank, F.S.B. WV
Progressive Bank, N.A.
WV
CNB Bank, Inc.
WV
The Poca Valley Bank, Inc.
WV
MCNB Bank and Trust Co.
WV
The Farmers Bank and Savings Co.
OH
Pendleton Community Bank, Inc.
WV
Jefferson Security Bank
WV
The Bank of Romney
WV
Logan Bank & Trust Company
WV
The Grant County Bank
WV
Union Bank, Inc.
WV
Citizens Bank of West Virginia, Inc.
WV
Remaining 33 banks:
Average
Standard Deviation

Assets States Counties
WV Deposits
($bil) (#) (# in WV) ($bil) (% of WV) (% of Bank)
2152.01
26
10
1.84
5.6
0.1
361.21
20
1
0.08
0.3
0.0
215.27
16
26
5.29
16.1
3.2
202.48
12
2
0.09
0.3
0.1
138.70
10
4
0.24
0.7
0.2
120.36
12
1
0.05
0.1
0.1
101.28
9
13
1.82
5.5
2.3
34.60
22
2
0.13
0.4
0.4
30.56
6
1
0.06
0.2
0.3
9.85
5
14
2.48
7.5
35.1
6.13
4
21
4.45
13.5
91.0
5.03
17
9
0.02
0.1
0.4
4.06
3
5
0.26
0.8
8.2
4.00
4
18
2.44
7.4
73.5
3.51
3
5
0.32
1.0
11.7
2.36
4
10
0.91
2.8
48.7
2.09
2
10
1.22
3.7
75.6
1.50
2
6
1.01
3.1
91.3
1.31
2
3
0.32
1.0
30.8
1.07
4
13
0.69
2.1
74.9
0.97
2
2
0.14
0.4
17.2
0.66
1
3
0.53
1.6
100.0
0.66
3
1
0.05
0.2
9.2
0.66
1
1
0.56
1.7
100.0
0.57
2
3
0.45
1.4
89.9
0.55
1
3
0.46
1.4
100.0
0.42
1
3
0.35
1.1
100.0
0.41
3
2
0.33
1.0
93.1
0.37
1
1
0.28
0.9
100.0
0.36
2
5
0.28
0.8
93.2
0.35
2
2
0.24
0.7
79.2
0.33
1
3
0.28
0.9
100.0
0.29
2
3
0.24
0.7
96.2
0.29
2
2
0.07
0.2
26.9
0.28
2
4
0.20
0.6
83.5
0.28
2
2
0.25
0.8
96.8
0.27
1
2
0.20
0.6
100.0
0.26
1
2
0.23
0.7
100.0
0.25
1
6
0.21
0.6
100.0
0.25
1
4
0.22
0.7
100.0
0.25
1
4
0.19
0.6
100.0
0.12
0.06

1.1
0.3
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1.8
0.9

0.10
0.05

0.3
0.1

98.6
4.1

Table 3a: Balance Sheet for US* and WV Banks, 2017
ASSETS
US*
WV
LIABILITIES
Loans 
54.7
69.8 Deposits (Domestic Offices)
Real estate 
27.4
56.2 Transaction 
Residential 
16.6
31.3 Non-transaction
Non-Residential 
10.8
24.9
MMDA
C&I
11.6
8.2
Other saving
Consumer
9.2
4.1
Time deposits 
Credit cards
4.6
0.1
<$250k 
Other consumer
4.6
4.0
≥$250k
Other loans 
7.1
2.0 Other Liabilities 
Net of unearned income
0.0
0.0 Deposits (Foreign Offices) 
Allowance for loans losses
-0.7
-0.7 Other borrowed funds
Securities
20.9
18.1 Other liabilities 
All other assets 
24.4
12.1
Cash and balances due 
11.0
4.3 Capital
Currency
0.4
0.5
Other 
10.6
3.9
Repos sold to Fed
2.4
0.4
Other assets 
11.1
7.4
TOTAL
100.0 100.0 TOTAL
Note1 :  indicates a p-value<0.05 for the paired t-test between WV and US∗ .

US*
76.8
12.3
56.7
30.5
16.6
9.6
6.2
3.4
19.7
7.8
7.88
4.0

WV
79.2
18.9
60.2
21.3
17.7
21.2
18.6
2.7
8.8
0.0
8.1
0.8

11.3

12.0

100.0

100.0

Table 3b: Income Statement for US* and WV Banks, 2017
INCOME
US*
WV
EXPENSES
US*
WV
Interest Income 
67.8
80.1 Interest Expense
12.3
13.6
Loans 
53.6
69.3 Transaction Accounts 
0.6
1.3
Real Estate 
22.9
55.4 Saving Accounts
2.8
2.2
C&I
8.7
8.1 Time Deposits 
3.4
7.0
Consumer
16.6
4.4 Purchased Fed Repos 
0.3
1.0
Other Loans 
5.5
1.4 US Treasuries Securities 
3.6
1.8
Securities
9.9
9.6 Other
1.7
0.3
Other Interest Income 
4.2
1.0 Noninterest Expense
87.7
86.4
Noninterest Income 
32.2
19.9 Salaries
41.7
43.9
Basic Banking Services
6.1
6.1 Assets
9.4
11.2
Investment Banking Services
11.7
6.6 Other
36.6
31.3
Other Noninterest Income 
14.4
7.3
TOTAL
100.0 100.0 TOTAL
100.0
100.0
Note1 :  indicates a p-value<0.05 for the asset-weighted paired t-test between WV and US∗ .
Note2 : There is a discrepancy in the data between the components of interest income on loans
and its aggregate value. We add this discrepancy to Other Loans.
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Table 4: FE(2) Regression Results for Liabilities and Equity, 2017
Dependent Variable:
TransDep

MMDAs

TimeDep

OthSav

OthLiab

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Capital
(6)

WV

25.65∗∗∗
(2.30)

10.31∗∗
(5.16)

25.35∗∗∗
(2.21)

12.39∗∗∗
(3.80)

14.80∗∗∗
(4.13)

11.49∗∗∗
(0.83)

US*

21.02∗∗∗
(0.73)

20.49∗∗∗
(1.63)

19.62∗∗∗
(0.70)

9.24∗∗∗
(1.20)

18.26∗∗∗
(1.30)

11.37∗∗∗
(0.26)

WV Data:
US* Data:
F-test: WV = US* (p-value)
Adjusted R2
F.E. Contribution (%)

18.9
12.3
0.36
0.74
79

21.3
30.5
0.05
0.77
86

21.2
9.6
0.01
0.73
32

17.7
16.6
0.29
0.66
75

8.8
19.7
0.34
0.71
0.60

12
11.3
0.86
0.95
90

Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets. Regressions are weighted by total assets.
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
F.E. contributions are the percentages of adjusted R2 explained by the fixed effects alone.

Table 5: FE(2) Regression Results for Assets, 2017
Dependent Variable:
RealEstLns

CILns

ConLns

OthLns

Sct

OthAssets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(3.71)

−3.20
(1.96)

1.91
(2.42)

1.52
(1.16)

35.84∗∗∗
(3.22)

13.07∗∗∗
(3.75)

US*

36.48∗∗∗
(1.17)

−0.13
(0.62)

3.79∗∗∗
(0.76)

5.52∗∗∗
(0.36)

38.21∗∗∗
(1.02)

16.80∗∗∗
(1.18)

WV Data:
US* Data:
F-test: WV = US* (p-value)
Adjusted R2
F.E. Contribution (%)

56.2
27.4
0.00
0.86
36

8.2
11.6
0.16
0.78
70

4.1
9.2
0.22
0.78
12

2.0
7.13
0.00
0.80
66

18.1
20.9
0.48
0.81
66

12.1
24.4
0.33
0.82
59

WV

51.46∗∗∗

Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets. Regressions are weighted by total assets.
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
F.E. contributions are the percentages of adjusted R2 explained by the fixed effects alone.
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Table 6: FE(2) Regression Results for Real Estate Loans, 2017
Dependent Variable:
ConstDev

Agric

1-4FamRes

5+FamRes

NResNFarm

Foreign

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

4.04∗∗∗
(0.67)

0.53
(0.68)

30.20∗∗∗
(2.46)

(1.39)

(1.98)

0.28
(0.25)

US*

2.43∗∗∗
(0.21)

2.02∗∗∗
(0.22)

17.24∗∗∗
(0.77)

3.57∗∗∗
(0.44)

10.88∗∗∗
(0.63)

0.35∗∗∗
(0.08)

WV Data:
US* Data:
F-test: WV = US* (p-value)
Adjusted R2
F.E. Contribution (%)

5.6
1.9
0.13
0.54
44

0.4
0.6
0.00
0.21
22

27.4
14.3
0.00
0.78
59

4.0
2.3
0.51
0.35
39

18.9
8.0
0.47
0.71
31

0
0.4
0.47
0.27
44

WV

4.03∗∗∗

12.39∗∗∗

Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets. Regressions are weighted by total assets.
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
F.E. contributions are the percentages of adjusted R2 explained by the fixed effects alone.

Table 7: FE(2), FE(51), and ME Regression Results, 2017

Class: Nonmember
Class: State Member
Class: Savings Bank
Class: State Assoc.
Owned: Multi-BHC
Owned: Single-BHC
Reg. by FDIC
Age: 0-10 yrs
Age: 10-20 yrs
Multi-state bank (small)
Multi-state bank (large)
Total Bank Branches (log)
Loans Charge-Offs (lagged)
sd(Random Effect #1)
sd(Random Effect #2)
sd(Residual)
State fixed effects
State random effects
Adjusted R2
F.E. Contribution (%)
χ2
Degrees of freedom
P-value (Ho:Random-effects=0)

RealEstLns
FE51
−3.135
2.216∗∗∗
4.965∗∗
1.563
−2.359∗
2.245∗∗
6.401∗∗∗
12.04∗∗∗
9.643∗∗∗
−1.304
−20.102∗∗∗
4.284∗∗∗
−0.00430

ME
−3.628∗
2.227∗∗∗
5.079∗∗
1.449
−2.458∗
2.214∗∗
6.852∗∗∗
12.10∗∗∗
9.690∗∗∗
−1.326
−20.512∗∗∗
4.362∗∗∗
−0.00437
0.0447
0.0171
15.54
No
Yes

Yes
No
0.907
75.8

517.5
13
0.00

13

∗

TimeDep
FE51
−0.864
0.953
2.669∗∗
3.784
−3.405∗∗∗
−2.204∗∗∗
3.859∗∗∗
3.656∗∗∗
2.720∗∗∗
1.997∗∗∗
2.753∗
−3.164∗∗∗
0.00155

Yes
No
0.838
85.0
13

ME
−0.745
1.049∗
2.768∗∗∗
3.961
−3.373∗∗∗
−2.131∗∗∗
3.758∗∗∗
3.604∗∗∗
2.620∗∗∗
1.971∗∗∗
2.699∗
−3.168∗∗∗
0.00161
0.128
0.0932
11.36
No
Yes

674.1
13
0.00

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
t statistics in parentheses.
Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variable is the percent share of total assets.
F.E. contributions are the percentages of adjusted R2 explained by the fixed effects alone.
Regressions are unweighted; instead, the state fitted values are weighted by share of state total assets.
The ME model for real estate loan shares include: 1) population median age; and 2) median house
price to income ratio. For the model evaluating time deposits shares we include: 1) share of population
over 62 years old; and 2) share of population with a high school degree or less.
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Table 8: Correlation of Financial Shares with the Real Economy, 2017

Time deposits to assets
C&I loans to assets
Real GDP per capita growth rate
Real GDP growth rate
Population growth rate
Median real house value growth rate
Unemployment rate
Labor force participation rate
Firms growth rate
Credit card delinquency rate
HHI of deposits for banks operating in each state
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Real estate loans
to assets
0.641∗∗∗
−0.248∗
0.144
0.0376
−0.210
−0.151
−0.105
−0.0634
−0.313∗∗
−0.227
−0.361∗∗∗

Time deposits
to assets
−0.285∗∗
−0.0412
0.0189
−0.272∗
−0.318∗∗
−0.279∗∗
0.0806
−0.323∗∗
−0.328∗∗
−0.594∗∗∗

A

Data Appendix
Table A1: Data Description

Variable Name
Explanatory Variables:
Class: Nonmember

Unit

Description

dummy

Class: State Member

dummy

Class: Savings Bank

dummy

Owned: Multi-BHC

dummy

Owned: Single-BHC

dummy

Reg. by FDIC

dummy

Total assets: 0-10 yrs
Age: 0-10 yrs
Age: 10-20 yrs

log units
dummy
dummy

Bank Size: Nat. % of Deposits
Total Bank Branches

bps
log units

Loans Charge-Offs (lagged)

bps

Equal to 1 if bank is a commercial bank, state
chartered, Fed nonmember, and supervised by the
FDIC or OCC.
Equal to 1 if bank is a commercial or savings bank,
state chartered, Fed member, and supervised by
the Federal Reserve.
Equal to 1 if bank is a savings bank, state chartered, and supervised by the FDIC.
Equal to 1 if bank is owned by a multi-bank holding
company.
Equal to 1 if bank is owned by a single-bank holding
company.
Equal to 1 if bank is primarily Regulated by the
FDIC.
The log of a bank’s total asets.
Equal to 1 if bank is younger than 10 years old.
Equal to 1 if bank’s age is between 10 and 20 years
old.
Bank’s share of total national deposits.
The log of a bank’s total number of
branches/offices.
One quarter lag of the bank’s total loans charge-offs
as a share of its total gross loans.

Z Variables (ST AT Es ):
Population Median Age
Median House Value to Income
Population: 62+ Years Old
Population: High School Degree

units
bps
bps
bps

Median age of the state population.
State median house value to personal income ratio.
Share of state population above 62 years old.
Share of state population with a high school degree
or less.

Correlation Table Variables:
Real GDP per Capita Growth
Real GDP Growth
Population Growth
Median House Value Growth
Unemployment Rate
Labor Force Participation
Firms Growth
Credit Card Delinquency Rates
Market Concentration (HHI)

bps
bps
bps
bps
bps
bps
bps
bps
bps

Real GDP per capita annual growth rate.
Real GDP annual growth rate.
State population annual growth rate.
State median house value growth rate.
State unemployment rate.
State labor force participation rate.
State business annual growth rate.
State share of credit card delinquency rate.
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of the deposit shares
of banks operating in each state.
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Table A2: Data Description: Dependent Variables
Variable Name
Dependent Variables:
Liabilities and Capital:
IntAccts

Unit

Description

bps

Bank’s interest-bearing deposits in domestic and
foreign offices as a share of the sum of the bank’s
total liabilities and total equity capital.
Bank’s sum of total demand deposits and
noninterest-bearing time and savings deposits in
domestic and foreign offices as a share of the sum of
the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital.
Bank’s federal funds purchased and securities sold
under agreements to repurchase as a share of the
sum of the bank’s total liabilities and total equity
capital.
Bank’s other borrowed funds as a share of the sum
of the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital..Other borrowed funds exclude deposits, federal
funds purchased, securities sold under agreements
to repurchase in domestic offices of the bank, and
trading liabilities.
Bank’s other liabilities as a share of the sum of
the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital.
Other liabilities include trading liabilities, subordinated debt, liability on acceptances executed and
outstanding, interest and other expenses accrued
and unpaid, and other liabilities.
Bank’s total equity capital as a share of the sum of
the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital.

NonIntAccts

bps

Frepp

bps

OthBorFunds

bps

OthLiab

bps

Capital

bps

Deposits:
TransDep

bps

MMDAs

bps

OthSav

bps

TmDep0-250k

bps

TmDep250k

bps

Assets:
RealEstLns

Bank’s transaction deposits as a share of the bank’s
total assets.
Bank’s deposits from money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) as a share of the bank’s total
assets.
Bank’s deposits from savings accounts excluding
MMDAs as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s time deposits under $250,000 as a share of
the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s time deposits over or equal to $250,000 as
a share of the bank’s total assets.

bps

CILns

bps

CrCdLns

bps

OthConsLns

bps

OthLns

bps

Bank’s real estate loans as a share of the bank’s
total assets.
Bank’s commercial and industrial loans as a share
of the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s credit card loans as a share of the bank’s
total assets.
Bank’s other consumer loans as a share of the
bank’s total assets. Other loans represent all consumer loans minus credit card loans.
Bank’s other loans as a share of the bank’s total
assets.
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. . . continued
Variable Name
Sct

Unit
bps

ChBal

bps

Frepo

bps

OthAssets

bps

Real Estate Loans:
ConstDev

Description
Bank’s securities as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s cash & balances due from depository institutions as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s federal funds sold and reverse repurchase as
a share of the bank’s total assets.
Bank’s other assets as a share of the bank’s total assets. Other assets include bank premises and fixed
assets, direct and indirect investments in real estate, trading account assets, intangible assets, and
other assets.

bps

Agric

bps

1-4FamRes

bps

5+FamRes

bps

NonResNonFarm

bps

Foreign

bps

Bank’s construction and land development loans
secured by real estate held in domestic offices as a
share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Bank’s loans secured by farmland held in domestic
offices as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Bank’s Total loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties held in domestic offices as a share of
bank’s total real estate loans.
Bank’s multifamily (5 or more) residential property
loans secured by real estate held in domestic offices
as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Bank’s nonresidential loans, excluding farm loans,
primarily secured by real estate held in domestic
offices as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Bank’s loans secured by Real Estate held in foreign
offices as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.

Income: Interest and Noninterest
i.RE
bps

i.CI

bps

i.Cons

bps

i.OthLns

bps

i.Sct

bps

Bank’s interest and fee income on loans secured by
real estate in domestic offices as a share of bank’s
total income.
Bank’s interest and fee income on commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans in domestic offices as a share
of bank’s total income.
Bank’s interest and fee income on consumer loans
in domestic offices as a share of bank’s total income.
These include credit card and other consumer loans
listed in Assets.
Bank’s interest and fee income on other loans as a
share of bank’s total income. Other loans include
loans to foreign governments and official institutions, and all other loans in domestic offices.
Bank’s interest and dividend on securities as a
share of bank’s total income. This variable includes
interest and dividend income from U.S. Treasury
securities, U.S. government agency and corporation
obligations, securities issued by states and political
subdivisions, other domestic debt securities, foreign debt securities, and equity securities (including investments in mutual funds). Excludes interest income from securities held in trading accounts.
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. . . continued
Variable Name
i.FFandOth

Nonii

Noninterest Income:
FiducAcvt

Unit
bps

Description
Bank’s other interest income as a share of bank’s
total income. Other interest income includes interest income from lease financing receivables, on
balances due from depository institutions, from assets held in trading accounts, on federal funds sold
and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and other interest income.
Bank’s noninterest income as a share of bank’s total
income. Noninterest income includes income from
fiduciary activities, plus service charges on deposit
accounts in domestic offices, plus trading gains
(losses) and fees from foreign exchange transactions, plus other foreign transaction gains (losses),
plus other gains (losses) and fees from trading assets and liabilities.

bps

bps

DepAcctsChg

bps

Trad

bps

Invest

bps

ServFees

bps

Securiz

bps

SalesAssets

bps

OthNonii

bps

Bank’s income from fiduciary activities as share of
bank’s total noninterest income.
Bank’s income from service charges on deposit account as share of bank’s total noninterest income.
Bank’s income from trading revenue as share of
bank’s total noninterest income.
Bank’s income from other investments as share
of bank’s total noninterest income. Other investments include venture capital revenue, fees and
commissions from securities brokerage, investment
banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions, and others.
Bank’s net servicing fees as share of bank’s total
noninterest income. Net servicing fees include income from servicing real estate mortgages, credit
cards, and other financial assets held by others.
Bank’s net securitization income as share of bank’s
total noninterest income. Securization income includes net gains (losses) on assets sold in securitization transactions.
Bank’s income from sales of loans and leases, other
real estate owned, and other assets as share of
bank’s total noninterest income.
Bank’s other noninterest income as share of bank’s
total noninterest income.

Expenses: Interest and Noninterest:
i.ExpDep
bps
i.ExpOth

bps

Nonix.Sal

bps

Nonix.As

bps

Bank’s total interest expense on deposits as a share
of bank’s total expenses.
Bank’s total interest expense excluding interest expense on deposits as a share of bank’s total expenses.
Bank’s salaries and employee benefits as a share of
bank’s total expenses.
Bank’s expenses of premises and fixed assets (net of
rental income) as a share of bank’s total expenses.
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. . . continued
Variable Name
Nonix.Oth

Interest Expenses:
TrAccts

Unit
bps

Description
Bank’s other noninterest expenses as a share of
bank’s total expenses. Other noninterest expenses
include goodwill impairment losses, amortization
expense and impairment losses for other intangible
assets, and other noninterest espenses.

bps

Bank’s expenses on transaction accounts as a share
of bank’s total interest expenses. Transaction accounts include interest-bearing demand deposits,
NOW accounts, ATS accounts, and telephone and
preauthorized transfer accounts.
Bank’s expenses on savings accounts as a share of
bank’s total interest expenses.
Bank’s interest expenses on time deposits as a share
of bank’s total interest expenses.
Bank’s interest expenses on federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase as a share of bank’s total interest expenses.
Bank’s interest expenses on demand notes issued to
the US Treasury, other borrowed money and interest on mortgage indebtedness and obligations under capitalized leases on a consolidated basis as a
share of bank’s total interest expenses.
Bank’s other interest expenses as a share of bank’s
total interest expenses. Other interest expenses include interest on deposits in foreign offices, trading liabilities, other borrowed money, and subordinated notes and debentures.

SavAcct

bps

TmDep

bps

efrepp

bps

USTrea

bps

OthExp

bps
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